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Martin Gilbert. Auschwitz and the Allies. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1981. 368 pp. Biographical notes and index. $15.95. 
Lucy S. Dawidowicz. The Holocaust and the Historians. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1981. xi + 187 pp. Notes and index. $15.00. 
Recently a number of books and articles have appeared which should per- 
suade historians to reconsider some of America's activities during World War 
11. One work, British Intelligence in the Second World War (1981), now in its 
second volume, reveals how much more British Intelligence knew about Ger- 
man affairs than many officials at the time acknowledged and than historians 
had imagined. Other studies, based on state and private archives in England, 
France, Germany, Israel, and the United States, have presented new details 
and insights to officialdoms in Western democracies, ranging from those in 
military command to bureaucrats in Vichy, France to public servants in 
Palestine. Two books written for the general public as much as for the profes- 
sion, Martin Gilbert's Auschwitz and the Allies and Lucy S. Dawidowicz's 
The Holocaust and the Historians, provoke important questions about the 
behavior of Americans when they encountered Germany's "Final Solution," 
during the war and in the historical records afterwards. 
In August 1942 Richard Lichtheim revealed with special clarity the essential 
secret of that "solution": 'We now know that deportation means death- 
sooner or later," he wrote from his Geneva listening post to colleagues of the 
Jewish Agency in London. He could not say where the transports stopped and 
how death came; for to him, then, and for many months to come the last 
stops remained hidden somewhere in Silesia, surrounded by euphemisms, 
deceit, and secrecy. Occasionally, the Polish city Oswiecim found its way 
into the news filtering across German borders, but when it did so it was read 
as the name of one or more labor camps in Upper Silesia, a region well- 
known for its mines and factories. (For the doubters of his insight, the failure 
to find the last stop of the transports strengthened the belief that actually 
most Jews were not being killed at all.) Nevertheless, in the face of disbelief, 
Lichtheim struggled to sustain his convictions and tried to persuade others to 
distinguish what was happening from mass killings of the past, in other wars, 
or even from recent German mass murders in the lands of the Polish and Rus- 
sian campaigns. The executions since 1939, he explained, had occurred on the 
local level, part of an organized system to be sure, but local in character; one 
assumed, hoped, that there, as in the harshest camps in other wars, the 
younger and stronger would survive. (Walter Laqueur quotes Lichtheim in 
Commentary, December 1970, p. 50). But this was different: 'This process of 
annihilation is going on relentlessly and there is no hope left to save any con- 
siderable number." He screamed about four million dead or soon to be dead 
Jews.l 
Two years later the secret became public knowledge. Between 1942 and 
1944 Auschwitz was the main center of the Final Solution: guards moved 
hundreds of thousands of Jews directly from the freight trains into the gas 
chambers from where their bodies were taken to crematoria which sent the 
remaining ashes into chimneys opening to the skies. Without hyphens, com- 
mas, or semicolons, I designate this act TRANSPORTZYKLONBKREMA- 
TORIA. 
TRANSPORTZYKLONBKREMATORIA remained a thinkable and 
unstoppable fact until the winter months of 1944-45 because the Allies 
excluded it from their strategic and tactical military target areas. By late sum- 
mer of 1944 that exclusion became especially significant, in part because 
buzz-bomb sites and rebellious Warsaw had become military targets. 
TRANSPORTZYKLONBKREMATORIA was then a publicly acknowledged 
condition in East Central Europe. On the ground, in France, American and 
British soldiers felt victory at hand; Generals Bradley and Patton even saw 
the high road into Germany for quick victory. General Montgomery dis- 
agreed: he wanted the northern route, much closer to the coast, because he 
wanted to end the war by conquering the Ruhr; the English general also 
wanted to destroy German forces on the coast, and to get the enemy out of 
V-1 and V-2 range of English civilians. At the same time Warsaw became a 
target. In the air war involving English and American units, photographs 
became available for the entire Auschwitz complex and regional rail network 
feeding into it. Allied bombers and reconnaissance planes were then raiding 
I. G. Farben's synthetic fuel plants in Auschwitz as well as other energy 
sources in East Central Europe. Some of these bombers also flew over the 
same area on their way to Warsaw where they sought to help the Polish 
Home Army embattled against German occupiers. On the basis of traditional 
methods of monitoring and surveillance, TRANSPORTZYKLONBKREMA- 
TORIA had become as visible and findable as the allied target areas of buzz- 
bomb launching sites and rebellious Warsaw. But still TRANSPORT- 
ZYKLONBKREMATORIA did not become a target area itself. 
Auschwitz and the Allies tries to explain why not. The core of Gilbert's 
evidence derives from the archives he knows well, those of the ministries and 
political leaders who made decisions of policy and administration about 
Jewish affairs during the Second World War. He has supplemented these 
sources with findings and conclusions published by Walter Laqueur (The Ter- 
rible Secret, 1980), Henry Feingold (Politics of Rescue, 1970), David Wyman 
(Commentary, May 1978), and Bernard Wasserman (Britain and the Jews o f  
Europe, 1979), among others, and with interviews, including one with a sur- 
vivor from an Auschwitz gas chamber who owes her life to a plane flying 
over Auschwitz that accidently dropped a bomb near the chamber into which 
she had been pressed and locked. As official biographer of Winston Churchill, 
Gilbert has long lived with Whitehall's archival collections from the days of 
England's wartime ministers assembled in the War Cabinet. He has written 
about other important subjects of European twentieth-century history, 
including a number of books especially concerned with Jews and World War 
11. This prolific English historian has also found fame through his many 
black-and-white atlases ranging over many parts of the Euro-American 
world. 
Gilbert has organized hundreds of quotations selected from confidential 
correspondence, often interoffice memos and minutes to the file, in which 
British ministers and their cadres of civil servants reveal themselves on the 
subject of Jews during World War 11. With the aid of fine maps and photo- 
graphs, his object is to focus old and new material on the question of when 
Auschwitz revealed itself. He provides just enough background about events 
in Europe so that the reader appreciates the information available to the Ger- 
mans, some of their allies, and some of the Jewish victims, and the informa- 
tion available to specific ministers or civil servants at any given moment, and 
then presents the official English, American, or Jewish response to that infor- 
mation. While the organization is often loose, even sprawling, Gilbert seeks 
to achieve dramatic tension by making Auschwitz the focal point of the circu- 
lating information. In this book Auschwitz eludes intelligence gatherers 
working for Jewish agencies in Palestine, Switzerland, England, and the 
United States. Between 1942 and spring 1944 Auschwitz remains hidden. 
What Gilbert's book does not reveal is that British Intelligence in the spring 
of 1942, had plucked Auschwitz out of the air waves coming from the Ger- 
man Nacht and Nebel. The Government Code and Cypher School decrypted 
"a daily return of prisoners at Dachau, Buchenwald, Auschwitz, and seven 
other concentration camps-not all of them," according to F. H. Hinsley and 
his colleagues in the second volume of British Intelligence in the Second 
World War (1981), "but a good cross-section." They summarize the results: 
'The daily returns consisted of a series of unheaded, unexplained columns of 
figures which G.C. and C.S. worked out to mean (a) number of inmates at 
the start of the previous day, (b) new arrivals, (c) departures by any means, 
and (d) number at the end of the previous day . . . ." G.C. and C.S. read 
departures by any means "as being accounted for primarily by deaths." The 
returns revealed that Auschwitz was the largest camp, with 20,000 prisoners, 
that illness was the main cause of death, but that shootings and hangings also 
took their fatal t011.~ 
In fact, British Intelligence had broken all the German police ciphers except 
for the one apparently used by the Gestapo. This meant that unless signals 
traveled by overland wires or messengers, the British could read, with ups 
and downs, until late in the war, SS messages and those sent and received by 
the non-Nazi party uniformed police. Between 1941 and 1943 the British 
deciphered many reports of authorized mass shootings. Hinsley et al, cite 
these as illustrative from the summer of 1941: from 18 July-30 August there 
were seven reports in which the victims were described variously as "Jews," 
"Jewish plunderers," "Jewish bolshevists," or "Russian soldiers," in "numbers 
varying from less than a hundred to several thousand . . ."; on August 7 the 
SS Cavalry Brigade reported that it had carried out 7,819 "executions in the 
Minsk area," and on the same day von dem Bach, commander of police in the 
central sector, reported that "30,000 executions had been carried out since the 
police arrived in Russia"; between 21-23 August, in the Southern Sector, "the 
shooting of Jews, in groups numbering from 61 to 4,200 was reported on 17 
occasions . . . ." In addition, since 1941 the English had also broken many 
different codes in use by continental railways, in part to sort out troop move- 
ments from other kinds of railway traffic. In conjunction with all other infor- 
mation they acquired, I find it hard to believe that by spring and summer of 
1942 people in Intelligence and in Whitehall had failed to find the last stops of 
the deportation trains. 
Within Gilbert's sources, Lichtheim and a host of others in Great Britain, 
Palestine, and America tried, almost always in vain, to gain acceptance and 
consideration of their pleas. English officialdom at Whitehall, usually with 
the acquiescence or support of the White House or State Department, man- 
aged to give the reasons why persecuted Jews, almost always, could not be 
treated as extraordinary victims deserving assistance, safe passage, exchange 
for prisoners of war or material goods, and asylum. The English and Ameri- 
can press often called for help. On December 17, 1942, Senza Papa, the allies 
issued a formal declaration denouncing bestial crimes against Jews. In the 
United States during 1944 official pressure for action to save Jews mounted. 
But throughout the two years Whitehall held fast: the horror stories were 
"familiar stuff" (p. 99). A "disproportionate amount of the time of the 
[Foreign] Office is wasted on dealing with these Jews" (p. 312). Pressure from 
America reflects the influence of Jewish voters and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. 
Moreover, according to Gilbert, even on occasion against the explicit wishes 
of Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the War Cabinet, Anthony Eden as 
Foreign Secretary, William Cavendish-Bentick as Chairman of the Joint Intel- 
ligence Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, and such other ministers as Oliver 
Stanley insisted on responding to Jewish children or adults who were escaping 
or might be able to do so, as if they were "nationals from a country with 
which we were at war" (p. 103), or as threatening English commitment in 
Palestine and to the Arabs, or as playing into the hands of Zionist ambitions, 
or as threatening to exacerbate anti-Semitism in England or the United 
States. 
The final crisis came in the fall of 1944 when Jews in particular appealed 
for military intervention against TRANSPORTZYKLONBKREMATORIA, 
when there was still time to protect some 800,000 Jews in Hungary against its 
impact. Gilbert patiently takes us into the War Cabinet and among some of 
the officers of the English and American Air Force. He reports concern about 
the safety of victims facing allied bombs, and about future German claims 
that air raids and not Germans had killed Jews. He discusses the hopes, confu- 
sions, and deceptions surrounding the offer to exchange Jews for trucks. He 
also identifies some bureaucratic snarls in decision making between the Air 
Ministry and the Foreign Secretary's Office. But, especially in light of the 
revelations about British Intelligence, in the end I must conclude that 
TRANSPORTZYKLONBKREMATORIA was not a fit target for allied 
public policy and military intervention because the Final Solution had been 
made into a private affair between Jews and the Germans who occupied 
Europe. 
Much of Gilbert's evidence is similar to what we know about the U.K. 
(from Wasserman), the U.S. (from Feingold and Wyman), and Vichy, France 
(from Michael R. Marrus and Robert 0 .  Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, 
1981). Officialdoms there almost always responded to news about Jews 
through experiences from the interwar period. TRANSPORTZYKLONB- 
KREMATORIA simply did not shatter the potency of that experience and the 
perceptions and decisions that flowed from it. Within a few minutes of each 
other some of Gilbert's people had to read and act upon memoranda which 
acknowledged mass murder and raised the possibility of finding asylum for a 
handful of refugees. Officials behaved as if the first had no bearing on the sec- 
ond because in their world the two events remained unrelated to each other. 
It was not that they did not know what TRANSPORTZYKLONBKREMA- 
TORIA was, meant, and represented. Whatever it was, it simply made no 
difference in the locks of past experience. 
For that reason, allied responses to Jewish pleading has been misleading. 
The Lichtheims wanted changed behavior because of events in occupied 
Europe. They pressed for urgency in the corridors where walked the first 
ministers and their generals who could exploit any and all diplomatic and 
military opportunities to frighten killers with future punishment and to rescue 
anyone who could be reached. Beyond such deeds it was understood that cir- 
cumstances precluded little else, until allied power had come within striking 
distance of the enemy. When that moment arrived mighty armadas would 
strike their blows with all possible speed. For that reason, the Lichtheims in 
1942 and 1943 agreed with their understanding of the allied slogan: an undi- 
vided and undistracted war effort was the quickest way to stop the Final Solu- 
tion. Who among Jewish leaders would have thought that TRANSPORT- 
ZYKLONBKREMATORIA would not be considered fit for the target list, the 
primary list, the secondary list-for any list? 
It is perhaps for that reason that Lucy Dawidowicz's book should not sur- 
prise. In recent years she has become a renowned authority on the Holocaust 
and the Jewish world in Europe it destroyed. Among other publications 
The Golden Tradition and The War Against the Jews stand as witnesses to 
her popularity and influence. The non-Jewish historical writing she has exam- 
ined sounds much the same as the officialdoms Gilbert and others have 
recently probed. Both Clio's officialdoms and those of political states 
remained tied to earlier traditions and experiences and responded to events in 
Germany's Europe in terms of their country's earlier policies and ambitions. 
Each group of national historians approach World War I1 from a special 
perspective and within it usually do not consider the history of the Jews dur- 
ing the occupation as a fit subject for professional concern. 
Dawidowicz's historians, in fact, share important premises not only with 
the ministries active in the work of Gilbert and the scholars who have studied 
them, but also with ministries busy with Jews in the years between 1945 and 
1948. Together they approached Jews in Europe as if the Final Solution made 
no difference: the earlier interwar period seemingly had provided them with 
impervious organizing principles and analytical categories. English, Russian, 
and American diplomats and generals almost always saw Jews as European 
nationals with a particular religious persuasion or insisted that public policy 
be blind to Jewish conditions as such. On that basis diplomats and officers in 
allied military government usually assumed that the experience with TRANS- 
PORTZYKLONBKREMATORIA was comparable to pogroms after 1918: 
not especially helpful for thinking and planning about Germany, Poland, or 
Russia and the Jews who happened to live there. 
In the 1950s, United States diplomat George Kennan expressed his variants 
of such approaches and assumptions. He remembered his annoyance with 
those who tried to obtain special sympathies for Jewish refugees just before 
World War 11. He also recalled news about horrendous atrocities after Ger- 
many invaded Russia-that is to say, when the European war turned into an 
Asian conflict within which all belligerents, including Americans, became 
extraordinarily ferocious. Recently, in a review of The War  Against the Jews, 
Henry Feingold stated the point for many of the historians Ms. Dawidowicz 
writes about: "students of European history concede that the Jews may have 
played a disproportionately important role in European history," but "they 
still hold that it was nevertheless a minor one, all things considered, and so 
the liquidation of the Jews, terrible as it was, was a relatively minor happen- 
ing. Genocide is neither unprecedented nor metaphysical. . . . Seen on the 
large canvas of European history, the Holocaust does not have the impor- 
tance and the uniqueness it has on the canvas of Jewish h i~ to ry . "~  
In this book Ms. Dawidowicz offers her conclusions explaining the dif- 
ferent perspectives on the Holocaust which separate her and a relatively small 
group of heterogeneous historians, almost all Jewish, from the rest of the pro- 
fession. She does this by first presenting the Holocaust as a distinct 
phenomenon, and then presenting her impressions of the Holocaust in "the 
more important works or work characteristic" of the histories available in 
England, the United States, Germany, Poland, Russia, and those of scholars 
publishing as historians professionally engaged with Jewish pasts. Her major 
conclusions are to be found in the Foreword, the Afterword, and scattered 
throughout the book. 
They rest on one important assumption. Professional historians have a 
"self-imposed mission to construct the past as it was" by striving to "offset 
individual subjectivity." This standard obliges the historian to engage in 
"rigorous reading of documents, fair selections of significant data, and honest 
deliberation." It requires a sensitive distinction between "apologetic" history 
and "conscientious" history, for that distinction is the prerequisite to "attain 
the goal of writing objective history." The standard demands locating "the 
human factor in explaining historical events" so that the historian can 
"decipher the import of those events." Ms. Dawidowicz knows what sort of 
work will flow from such a standard: "history is at bottom an account of 
what men did and achieved, and the historian's task is to untangle that 
meshwork of human character, behavior, and motive whose intertwining 
creates the very material of history." She identifies the one historian who for 
the subject of the book lived up to that professional standard. Karl Dietrich 
Bracher's The German Dictatorship (1969) "combined scrupulous objectivity, 
moral judgment, and a passionate commitment to the democratic ethos. . . . 
It is a work of unparalleled distinction in all the historical literature on the 
Third Reich produced in any language." It also agrees with her. It "recognized 
from the start the Nazis assigned primacy of place, in doctrine and in action, 
to make hatred of the Jews with all its tragic consequences, a cardinal feature 
of the state's policy" (pp. 65-67). 
On the basis of such a standard Ms. Dawidowicz concludes that the 
encounter with the Holocaust has led to professional failure on an interna- 
tional scale. Within the framework of "national traditions or political situa- 
tions," a general "lack of interest in the fate of Jews," was especially responsi- 
ble for this particular lapse from professional standards. She makes her case 
most effectively when examining the publications of historians in the service 
of National Socialism and Communism. Here the standard does not exist. 
Understanding party policies explains Orwellian history. In each instance, 
but with special detail for Poland and Russia since 1945, Ms. Dawidowicz 
reveals party needs against the background of historical and current events. 
One result in the 1950s, before Stalin's death, was to make armed resistance 
"a historical theme" and "given pride of place," an approach that reflected the 
prescribed approach in Soviet and Polish historiography. Another conse- 
quence muted or eliminated anti-Semitism among Poles and stressed instead 
their wartime friendliness toward Jews. Then, between 1953 and 1956 the 
line changed or loosened. Accounts about the war and Jews followed suit, 
and until the mid-sixties moved closer to nonideological history. After 1967 
Poland and Russian party needs changed again and Dawidowicz traces them 
to the logical end where "History Done, Redone, and Undone" uses evidence 
from the Stalinist era and turns Zionists into organizers of the Holocaust! (p. 
78). 
Her discussion of historians working in England, the United States, and 
Germany is not so useful. To be sure, it is helpful to have some additional 
evidence for conclusions about American historians available to the profes- 
sion since at least 1970. It is also convenient to have an informative summary 
of German monographs on historians in Germany during the Nazi period. 
But these benefits do not compensate for the general weakness inherent in this 
part of her book. Without some sort of systematic approach to the historians' 
changing, many-sided literature since World War 11, it is hard if not impossi- 
ble to present the texture and subtlety of the many books and articles pub- 
lished in English and German. Her standard, and the way she uses it in select- 
ing works for discussion and analysis, just won't do. The point is not that her 
general conclusions are wrong; the approach and the method she uses simply 
do not warrant them. 
There is another yet deeper problem with this part of the book. Especially 
in passages involving Jewish scholars, historiography, and history Ms. 
Dawidowicz is too engaged, too devoted to her passions to be entirely trusted 
with the method she employs. Correctly, she calls attention to a select group 
of historians who as Jews shared a personal experience with National 
Socialism, which in the United States made them different from their col- 
leagues in the profession: George Mosse and Fritz Stem are among them, and 
Ms. Dawidowicz applauds them. Peter Gay is another, a prolific and influen- 
tial student of European society and culture who has contributed significantly 
to the literature about Germans and Jews. A lonely footnote mentioning him 
as one of the two senior editors of the Columbia History of the World won't 
do, even though Ms. Dawidowicz's criticisms of the work are valid enough. 
Since 1972, when that History was published, Gay has written some of the 
most powerful passages available denouncing trivializers of the Holocaust 
and those who deny its particular German and Jewish characteristics. 
Yehuda Bauer is another example, perhaps an even more glaring one, of 
the weaknesses inherent in Ms. Dawidowicz's approach. An Israeli scholar 
who has devoted his entire career to the study of the Holocaust, he has an 
international reputation of distinction. Some American historians may be 
familiar with his studies of the American Jews and the Holocaust. He deserves 
more than a footnote to his "popular pamphlet," even if its title, They Chose 
Life: Jewish Resistance in the Holocaust, can be taken as "an offense against 
the murdered Jews in its implication that those who did not engage in armed 
resistance to the Germans chose death over life" (p. 178). But there is more 
here than meets the eye. In her important discussion of Jewish historians and 
the Holocaust are embedded all sorts of ideological currents and such prob- 
lems as continuities and discontinuities in Jewish history. For Ms. 
Dawidowicz the state of Israel, in relation to the world the Holocaust 
destroyed, is at or near the heart of such problems. Ms. Dawidowicz believes 
the "destruction of the European Jews during the Second World War eclipsed 
all previous disasters in Jewish history and may have imperiled the future of 
the Jewish people . . ." (p. 141). She also argues that Israel as a political state 
was "legitimated as a recompense for the murder of the European Jews," and 
as a community "is producing a radically different Jewish culture from that of 
European Jewry." It is not yet evident, she says about Bauer's society, 
"whether Israel can develop the creative cultural energy that will succeed" in 
doing what her Jewry in Europe had done: "binding Jews of the world 
together, while conserving the traditions of the past and evolving new ones" 
(p. 14). For his part, Bauer lives within ideological tradition not particularly 
receptive to such judgments. But obviously they cannot so interfere with the 
scholarship of professional historians a la Bracher. 
For American historians these features of combat are not so important as 
are other aspects of the books reviewed here. The Holocaust and the 
Historians shows us the international variations with which colleagues have 
obscured our vision toward the recent past. If Ms. Dawidowicz is correct, on 
the subject of the Holocaust at least, the difference between colleagues in 
America and those abroad may be much smaller than we like to admit. In 
that connection the similarity between Clio's officialdom and those of 
political states between 1939 and 1948 may deserve special scrutiny, if only 
because a study of that subject may probe deeply into the nature of American 
nationalism and professionalism in those important years of the republic's 
history. 
As a phenomenon in Euro-American history, the Holocaust contains some 
other important subjects for American historians. After 1941 the zone of 
TRANSPORTZYKLONBKREMATORIA was as much a part of the 
American war as it was a part of the war being waged by European allies. Yet 
that zone did not become part of the military's target area. Revelations from 
England's intelligence archives about German behavior in occupied Europe 
prompt general questions about the circulation of intelligence information 
between English and American officials, and, in connection with other 
evidence, focus once again upon Euro-America in the shaping of anti-Jewish 
policies. 
Finally, there is the controversial subject to which Ms. Dawidowicz also 
calls attention, the struggle against prison, forced labor, and slavery. Since 
the war itself, attention has remained on acts of armed resistance and their 
relative importance in understanding Jews and the Nazi regime that ruled 
them. Early on, academics and publicists in this country offered points of 
comparison and analogy with other circumstances, in part because 
"resistance" had been charged with ideological purposes and was becoming 
an object of social scientific investigation concerned with anomy, autonomy, 
or alienation. This entire discussion is itself fit for the American historian's 
scrutiny. 
In other words, the Holocaust and its preconditions are an important part 
of Euro-American history. The profession will come around to acknowledg- 
ing that fact in its departmental offerings and research ventures. After all, just 
last year a special committee of the Organization of American Historians cer- 
tified that the Holocaust was not a figment of the Jewish imagination. 
Professor Korrnun, New York State School o f  Industrial and Labor Relations, 
Cornell University, is the author of many articles on American historians and 
the Holocaust. 
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